We experimentally explore indefinitely repeated contests. Theory predicts more cooperation, in the form of lower expenditures, in indefinitely repeated contests with a longer expected time horizon, yet our data do not support this prediction. Theory also predicts more cooperation in indefinitely repeated contests compared to finitely repeated contests of the same expected length, but we find no significant difference empirically. When controlling for risk and gender, we actually find significantly higher long-run expenditure in some indefinite contests relative to finite contests. Finally, theory predicts no difference in cooperation across indefinitely repeated winner-take-all and proportional-prize contests. We find significantly less cooperation in the latter, because female participants expend more on average than their male counterparts in our data. Our paper extends the experimental literature on indefinitely repeated games to contests and, more generally, contributes to an infant empirical literature on behavior in indefinitely repeated games with "large" strategy spaces.
Introduction
Contests are frequently-observed strategic situations where players devote costly and irreversible resources (such as time, money, or effort) to increase their chances of winning a reward (e.g., a prize, rent, or patent). Research and development races, advertising wars, political campaigns, lobbying efforts, legal battles, sports tournaments, and employee-ofthe-month challenges are all examples of contests.
A defining characteristic of many contests is that they are dynamic. For example, Coca-Cola and Pepsi have targeted aggressive advertising campaigns at each other since the 1950s. Both firms continue to engage in a series of monthly, weekly, and even daily contests for soft drink market share, and their ongoing feud has no well-defined time horizon.
This study focuses on a particular class of dynamic contests in which the contest length is unknown. Specifically, we experimentally explore behavior in two-player repeated contests of indefinite length.
1 The experimental indefinite supergame literature has largely focused on the Prisoner's Dilemma (PD).
2 To the best of our knowledge, no study has yet experimentally examined behavior in indefinitely repeated contests. Indefinitely repeated contests are interesting not only because contests are important economic phenomena, but also because contests have (relatively) large strategy spaces, and very little is known about behavior in indefinitely repeated games with large strategy spaces. Our paper both extends the existing experimental indefinite supergame literature to contests and adds to our general understanding of behavior in indefinite supergames with many feasible actions.
Existing experimental studies of the indefinitely repeated PD focus on two predictions from the theory of repeated games: (i) Cooperation increases in the expected length of an indefinite supergame, and (ii) Cooperation in indefinite supergames should be at least as high as cooperation in finite supergames. Many, though not all studies confirm these predictions.
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1 Games that are repeated a known number of times are termed finite supergames or finitely repeated games, while games with an unknown time horizon are indefinite supergames or indefinitely repeated games (Friedman, 1971) .
2 For example, see Murnighan and Roth (1983); Dal Bó (2005) ; Duffy and Ochs (2009); Dal Bó and Fréchette (2011) . Dal Bó and Fréchette (Forthcoming) survey of the experimental supergame literature. Non-prisoner's dilemma indefinite supergame experiments include Palfrey and Rosenthal (1994) ; Sell and Wilson (1999) ; Tan and Wei (2014) ; Lugovskyy et al. (2017) (public goods), Engle-Warnick and Slonim (2006a,b) (trust), Holt (1985) ; Feinberg and Husted (1993) (oligopoly) , McBride and Skaperdas (2014) (conflict), and Camera and Casari (2014) ; Duffy and Puzzello (2014) (monetary exchange) .
3 Some studies mostly confirm theory (Dal Bó, 2005; Duffy and Ochs, 2009; Dal Bó and Fréchette, 2011;  Contests and PDs are social dilemmas. In both games, the equilibrium of the stage game is not socially optimal, but the socially optimal or "cooperative" outcome can be supported in an indefinite supergame when players are sufficiently patient. However, there are critical differences between contests and PDs.
First, as already mentioned, relative to the two-strategy PD, there are many more feasible strategies in contests. Moreover, contests do not have a dominant strategy. In this respect they are not only more complex than PDs, but also more complex than linear public good games (PGG) that can serve as extended strategy space analogs of the PD. Contests have a nonmonotone (typically, single-peaked) best response; that is, relatively low expenditure levels are best responses to both low rival expenditure and high rival expenditure. This contrasts with PDs and linear PGGs which have a dominant strategy, and to coordination games and supermodular games which have unidirectional best responses.
Finally, behaviorally, contests are rife with "overbidding"-an almost ubiquitous experimental finding that average expenditure exceeds the risk-neutral Nash equilibrium expenditure and that a sizable fraction of participants choose strictly dominated expenditures (Sheremeta, 2013; Dechenaux, Kovenock and Sheremeta, 2015) . By construction, such overbidding is impossible in PDs, PGGs, or supermodular games. It is thus an open empirical question as to whether the comparative statics of cooperation in indefinitely repeated contests are similar to those in indefinitely repeated PDs and other previously studied games.
We conduct indefinitely repeated contest experiments using the well-established continuation probability approach.
4 Following Dal Bó (2005) 's seminal indefinitely repeated PD study, our experimental design lets us compare cooperation across indefinite contests of different expected length and between finitely and indefinitely repeated contests of the same expected length. As do existing indefinitely repeated PD studies, we ask two main questions: (i) Does cooperation increase in the expected length of indefinite contest supergames?, and (ii) Is cooperation greater in indefinite contest supergames compared to finite contest supergames? We also consider whether contest outcomes depend on the allocation rule for distributing the contested prize. Specifically, we examine a winner-take-all allocation rule and a proportional-prize allocation rule.
In a winner-take-all setting (Tullock, 1980) , the entire contest prize is awarded stochastically, according to probabilities equal to each players' share of total expenditure. As in a patent race, this setting is extreme because one player receives the prize, while all other players receive zero revenue. In a proportional-prize setting (Long and Vousden, 1987) , each player's share of the contest prize is their share of total expenditure. As in our Cola Wars example, this "smooth" allocation rule implies that a firm's market share is increasing in its own advertising expenditure, but decreasing in its rivals' expenditures. For risk-neutral players, the equilibrium expenditure is the same across both settings, but empirically: Is cooperation the same across indefinitely repeated winner-take-all and proportional-prize contests?
We observe little evidence of greater cooperation in indefinitely repeated contests of larger expected length. Comparing across two expected lengths, there is no difference in our winner-take-all data. There is some difference in our proportional-prize data, but when we control for our participants' risk preferences and gender-characteristics previously found to significantly affect contestant behavior-this result vanishes. We also do not observe more cooperation in indefinitely repeated contests compared to finitely repeated contests of the same expected length in either contest setting. In fact, when we control for risk and gender, we find evidence of less long-run cooperation in indefinite contests relative to finite contests. Finally, we find strong evidence of greater cooperation in winner-take-all contests relative to proportional-prize contests. This result is driven by differences in average expenditure across gender.
Our results are particularly interesting vis-à-vis results from indefinitely repeated prisoner's dilemma experiments where at least some support is typically found for predictions of the theory of repeated games. As in a recent study of indefinitely repeated public good games (Lugovskyy et al., 2017) , we find less support for these predictions in our contest environments. While much experimental work remains to be done on indefinite supergames with "large" strategy spaces, the early returns suggest that standard theory has less predictive power in more complex indefinite supergames than in relatively simpler indefinite supergames such as the prisoner's dilemma.
Our paper is organized as follows: In Section 2 we briefly describe a model of indefinitely repeated contests. Section 3 details our experimental design and procedures. We outline our three testable hypotheses in Section 4. In Section 5 we analyze the results of experiments, and we discuss our results and conclude in Section 6.
2 Theory
We consider two contest settings. The first setting is the winner-take-all contest (WTA) where one player earns all of the prize revenue and all other players earn zero prize revenue. The second setting is the proportional-prize contest (PP ) where each player earns a share of the prize revenue equal to their expenditure divided by total expenditure. Because we assume that all players are risk-neutral, and because we use the standard lottery contest success function (CSF) of Tullock (1980) , both settings are strategically equivalent and the equilibria for both settings coincide. Without loss of generality, we provide details of a dynamic contest model assuming each that stage game is a WTA contest.
The Stage Game
Consider a contest with two risk-neutral players, indexed by i = 1, 2, competing for a prize V > 0 by independently and simultaneously choosing expenditure levels x i ≥ 0. The probability of Player 1 winning the contest is given by the CSF:
and the probability of Player 2 winning is 1 − p(x 1 , x 2 ). The expected payoffs of the players are:
In the unique symmetric Nash equilibrium (NE), both players choose expenditure levels
and earn expected payoffs π * = V 4
. Socially optimal, cooperative play (SO) is characterized by both players choosing expenditure x so = 0 and earning expected payoffs
. In what follows, we use a modified version of the contest game where expenditure levels x i are restricted to nonnegative integers. For a sufficiently large V , this modified game is a good approximation of the original game and has the same equilibrium and socially optimal expenditures and payoffs as the original game, provided that V is divisible by 4.
The Supergame
Consider an infinitely repeated, dynamic game where the modified contest described in Section 2.1 is the stage game. Both players discount future payoffs by factor δ ∈ [0, 1].
Fully cooperative play (both players choosing x so forever) can be supported as a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE) in this dynamic game if both players use a Nash reversion, grim trigger strategy and if δ satisfies the condition:
The left-hand side of (3) is the expected payoff from full cooperation, and the right-hand side of (3) is the payoff from the best deviation (expenditure x dev = 1 leads to stage game payoff V − 1 for the deviating player, provided that the other player spends x so = 0).
Rearranging Condition (3) yields:
Thus if the players are sufficiently patient, a cooperative solution of (x 1 , x 2 ) = (0, 0) can be sustained indefinitely. Note that Condition (4) only ensures that players prefer cooperation to immediately deviating and suffering the consequences of competitive NE play under the specific trigger strategy we defined above. There are (uncountably) many other trigger strategies, not to mention other, alternative strategies for playing the indefinitely repeated game. So the condition ensuring that players prefer the cooperative solution need not always be Condition (4).
Experimental Design and Procedures
To explore how contest expenditure is affected by the discount factor (continuation probability) and by the contest setting, we utilized a 2×2, between-participant experimental design. Along one dimension we varied the continuation probability (Low δ or High δ) and along the other we varied the contest setting (WTA or PP ). Additionally, for each combination of discount factor and contest setting, we followed Dal Bó (2005) and conducted finitely-repeated "control" sessions of the same expected length as our indefinitelyrepeated sessions. The resulting eight treatments are summarized in Table 1 .
All of our experiments were conducted at the Economic Science Institute of Chapman University. A total of 240 participants (58.8% female) took part. Each participant was in exactly one session, and none of our participants were experienced in our environment. The experiment was implemented in z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007) . Low δ sessions lasted approximately 40 minutes, while High δ sessions took roughly 80 minutes to complete. After participants entered the computer lab, they were randomly assigned to visuallyisolated computer carrels. Instructions were read out loud and a printed, reference copy was distributed to participants (see Appendix A for sample instructions). After the instruction phase, participants completed an unpaid practice stage where they entered hypothetical expenditures for themselves and a "paired participant" three times to generate three practice contest outcomes. This practice stage familiarized participants with the underlying contest environment.
All monetary figures in the experiments were denominated in Experimental Currency Units, or ECUs. For all treatments, participants made integer expenditures in the range [0, 120] in each stage game contest. The stage game contest prize was V = 120, so that the NE effort was x * = 30 and the payoff assuming NE expenditure was π * = 30. Because x SO = 0, under our parameterization, the payoff assuming SO expenditure was π so = 60, or twice the payoff under NE expenditure. By Condition (4) from Section 2.2, a prize of V = 120 implies a threshold discount factor ofδ = 0.663. We chose our two discount factors so that the socially optimal, cooperative outcome was supportable with the Nash reversion, grim trigger strategy discussed in Section 2.2 in our -High treatments (δ = 0.8), but not in our -Low treatments (δ = 0.5). For all treatments, each experimental session consisted of 10 supergames whose stage games are outlined in theory in Section 2.1. We will refer to a stage game as a 'round. ' Prior to the start of the first supergame, participants were randomly paired and instructed that they would only interact with their current "paired participant" during the current supergame. Between supergames, participants were randomly re-paired according to a zipper matching protocol (Cooper et al., 1996) . Participants were instructed that they would interact with every other participant in their session during one, and only one, supergame.
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In the Indefinite treatments, discounting was implemented through random supergame termination.
6 Different pre-drawn realizations of supergame length were used across sessions with the same value of δ. The supergame lengths are shown in Table 2 . We constructed Sequence B [E] from Sequence A [D] by swapping the first two supergames (1 and 2) with the last two supergames (9 and 10). For continuation probability δ, the expected supergame length is 1 1−δ , or 2 periods when δ = 0.5 and 5 periods when δ = 0.8. All of our Finite sessions used either Sequence C or Sequence F in Table 2 .
The first round of each supergame was always played. 7 Once participants submitted their expenditures, the outcome of the stage contest was randomly or non-randomly determined in accordance with CSF (1) from Section 2.1. In the WTA sessions, one participant received the entire 120 ECU prize; in the PP sessions, the prize was split according to the expenditure shares. At the end of a round, participants were shown their own expenditure, their rival's expenditure, and their payoff for the round. After each round in the Indefinite treatments, a random integer T ∈ [1,
Many indefinite supergame experiments use this procedure (Dal Bó, 2005; Dal Bó and Fréchette, 2011; McBride and Skaperdas, 2014) . As noted in Dal Bó (2005) , zipper matching precludes direct contagion effects.
6 See Fréchette and Yuksel (2017) for additional ways to implement discounting in indefinitely repeated games and comparisons between them.
7 We did not use the words 'supergame' or 'round' in the experimental instructions. Instead, we refereed to a supergame as a 'period' and rounds within the supergame as a 'decision.' drawn and shown to participants. If T = 1 was shown, the current supergame ended; if any other number was shown, another round was played.
8 During each round, participants were reminded that there was a (1 − δ) × 100% chance that they were playing the last round of the current supergame. The total payoff in a supergame was calculated as the sum of payoffs from all of the rounds in that supergame. At the end of the experiment, participants were paid their earnings for one of the supergames, selected at random (Azrieli, Chambers and Healy, Forthcoming) . The exchange rate was 25 ECU to 1 US Dollar. Participants earned $23.22 on average, including a $7.00 show-up fee.
Hypotheses
We examine the following hypotheses: Hypothesis 1. In indefinite supergames, expenditure is lower (more cooperative) with δ = 0.8 than with δ = 0.5. Hypothesis 1 is a standard result from the theory of repeated games and is a direct consequence of the analysis presented in Section 2. Holding the contest setting constant, expenditure should be lower in our High δ-Indefinite treatments relative to our Low δ-Indefinite treatments. This should be true under either contest setting.
Hypothesis 2(a) results from the fact that the Nash reversion, grim trigger strategy from Section 2.2 can support socially optimal cooperation in our High δ-Indefinite treatments but not in our High δ-Finite treatments. In theory, it does so under either contest setting.
Hypothesis 2(b) follows from the fact that a Nash reversion strategy cannot support socially optimal cooperation in any of our Low δ treatments (whether Indefinite, Finite, WTA, or PP ). However, other cooperative outcomes where gains from deviation are not as large can be supported. For example, consider the following strategy: Choose expenditurex < x * as long as the other player chooses expenditurex or lower; otherwise, choose x * forever. Asx increases from zero to
, the threshold value of δ necessary to support cooperation decreases monotonically to zero. 9 We thus hypothesize that at least some cooperation (not necessarily the socially optimal level) will be observed in the Low δIndefinite treatments. Hypothesis 3 is a direct consequence of our risk-neutral equilibrium characterization. There is mixed empirical evidence related to this hypothesis. Fallucchi, Renner and Sefton (2013) report similar expenditure in WTA and PP settings when participants receive complete post-round feedback. However, when feedback is limited to players' own information, expenditure is greater in WTA contests. Cason, Masters and Sheremeta (2010) find similar expenditures across WTA and PP settings irrespective of whether entry into the contest is exogenous or endogenous. Shupp et al. (2013) report greater expenditure in PP contests than in WTA contests. Finally, assuming individual output is a noisy function of individual investments, Cason, Masters and Sheremeta (Forthcoming) report greater expenditure in WTA contests relative to PP contests. Note that none of these studies examine indefinitely repeated contests.
While our experimental instructions are as neutral as possible, the perceived "competitiveness" of the contest may be greater in the WTA setting than in the PP setting. This is plausible ex ante because one player receives the entire contest prize in the WTA setting, whereas players can "split" the prize in the PP setting. Thus an alternative, "behavioral" version of Hypothesis 3 predicts less cooperative expenditure (i.e. higher expenditure) in the WTA setting than in the PP setting.
This behavioral hypothesis can be formalized with a joy of winning model where players receive a relatively large non-monetary utility from winning a WTA contest (Goeree, Holt and Palfrey, 2002; Sheremeta, 2013; Boosey, Brookins and Ryvkin, 2017) . In a PP contest, the concept of winning is not as sharply defined as in a WTA contest. It is plausible that some participants think they "win" a contest when their share of the prize exceeds one half, but the utility of winning is less salient in the PP setting.
9 Formally, the stage game best response to expenditurex < V 4 isx =
√
Vx −x (ignoring the integer problem) and the payoff from optimal deviation isπ = ( √ V − √x ) 2 , whereas the payoff from the cooperative strategy profile (x,x) is V 2 −x. A derivation similar to the one in Section 2.2 produces a threshold value of the discount factorδ =
. It can be shown thatδ decreases monotonically
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Following Dal Bó (2005), we mostly focus on expenditure levels in the first round of each supergame. This is the only round where the expected number of rounds is the same across Indefinite and Finite treatments. To see this, compare our WTA-High δ-Indefinite treatment to our WTA-High δ-Finite treatment. In Round 1, the expected number of rounds is 5 in both treatments. In Round 2, it is still 5 in WTA-High δ-Indefinite, but it is only 4 in WTA-High δ-Finite. By examining Round 1 behavior, we can assess whether indefiniteness matters. We pool across our two Indefinite sessions for each discount factor and contest setting because rank sum tests suggest that there are no Round 1 session effects (p > 0.345 for all tests).
5.1 Does continuation probability affect expenditure? To determine if there are any statistically significant differences in expenditure across the Low δ-Indefinite and High δ-Indefinite treatments, we estimate several ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions. Our primary specification is:
The sample only includes expenditures from the first round of supergames. The dependent variable is Participant i's expenditure in the actual experimental round t. We control for the overall effect of experience with variable Round t , which is the actual round in which the expenditure occurs (1-20 in Low δ treatments, 1-51 in High δ treatments). HighDelta i is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the participant is in a High δ treatment, and 0 otherwise. Table 3 shows regression results. Standard errors, clustered at the participant level, are shown in parenthesis. Our specification yields "slope" and "intercept" estimates for each treatment. The Low δ-Indefinite intercept estimate is Constant, and the High δ-Indefinite intercept estimate is the sum of Constant and the coefficient on HighDelta. The partial effect of round (the slope estimate) is the coefficient on Round for Low δ-Indefinite and the sum of coefficients on Round and HighDelta×Round for High δ-Indefinite. For WTA-High δ-Indefinite this estimate is −0.48, which is significantly different from zero (p = 0.003). The estimate for WTA-Low δ-Indefinite is −0.32, which is also statistically significant (p = 0.014). The estimates in Table 3 can be summarized as follows. When experience is controlled for-see column (2)-expenditure is initially lower in WTA-High δ-Indefinite relative to WTA-Low δ-Indefinite. However, this gap narrows with time, because expenditure in WTA-High δ-Indefinite falls by 0.32 each round, but it falls by 1.18 in WTA-Low δ-Indefinite with each passing round. For the PP setting-see column (4)-there is no initial difference in expenditure across PP-High δ-Indefinite and PP-Low δ-Indefinite. In PP-High δ-Indefinite, expenditure falls by 0.32 each round, and there is no statistically significant time trend in PP-Low δ-Indefinite. These conclusions correspond to the visuals in Figures 1c and 1d .
We can use the estimates in Table 3 to predict expenditure in Round t. Specifically:
13 Table 4 : Estimated Expenditure Differences, by Round Note: Significance levels: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
The estimated difference in expenditure across High δ-Indefinite and Low δ-Indefinite treatments is shown in Table 4 for the WTA sessions-see column (1)-and the PP sessions-see column (2). Estimates are only reported for Rounds 1-20, because above Round 20, estimates are "out of sample" for the Low δ-Indefinite treatments. According to our estimated model, average expenditure only differs significantly across High δ and Low δ in the first two rounds of WTA-Indefinite. In PP-Indefinite, average expenditure is significantly different (p < 0.1) in Rounds 10-20. In light of Figure 1 and Table 3 , it is clear that contest experience matters. There are declining time trends in average expenditure in Figure 1 until approximately Supergame 5. While the estimates in Table 3 suggest a treatment effect across WTA-High δ-Indefinite and WTA-Low δ-Indefinite, this difference is not statistically significant over time (i.e., when the effect of the intercept and slope estimates are both accounted for as in Table  4 ). On the other hand, Tables 3 and 4 both suggest a difference in expenditure across PP-High δ-Indefinite and PP-Low δ-Indefinite over time.
Result 1. Experience affects average expenditure in indefinitely repeated contests with both δ = 0.8 and δ = 0.5, and under both WTA and PP allocation rules. Result 2. There is no significant difference in average expenditure across δ in indefinitely repeated WTA contests. However, after several rounds of contest experience, average expenditure is lower in indefinitely repeated PP contests with δ = 0.8 relative to indefinitely repeated PP contests with δ = 0.5.
In summary, we find mixed support for Hypothesis 1. We now consider evidence related to Hypothesis 2. There is no evidence in either Figure 2a or Figure 2b suggesting a difference in average expenditure across WTA-High δ-Finite and WTA-High δ-Indefinite. On the other hand, Figures 2c and 2d appear to show that with contest experience average expenditure is actually higher in PP-High δ-Indefinite relative to PP-High δ-Finite. This is surprising because Hypothesis 2 implies lower expenditure in indefinitely repeated games relative to finitely repeated games of the same expected length.
Does indefiniteness affect expenditure?
As before, we examine expenditure across treatments formally with regression anal-ysis. Table 5 contains estimates from specifications that are analogous to Specification (5) with HighDelta i replaced by Indef inite i , an indicator variable equal to 1 if the participant was in an Indefinite treatment, and 0 otherwise. The "intercept" coefficient estimates in Table 5 do not indicate any differences in initial average expenditure across either WTA-High δ-Indefinite and WTA-High δ-Finite or PP-High δ-Indefinite and PP-High δ-Finite. The partial effect of time on expenditure is significant and negative for Low δ treatments in both contest settings. For the WTA treatments, the partial effect of time on expenditure is −0.48 (p = 0.004), and it is −0.32 (p = 0.015) for the PP treatments.
As we did for our δ comparisons, we use the model estimates to estimate expenditures for Rounds 1-20. These are shown in columns (3) and (4) of Table 4 . None of the differences across Indefinite and Finite are statistically significant.
Result 3. There is no significant difference in average expenditure across indefinitely repeated contests and finitely repeated contests of the same expected length, for either the WTA allocation rule or the PP allocation rule.
We focus on the High δ treatments in this subsection, but the results for the Low δ treatments are qualitatively the same. For Low δ, regression analysis suggests no difference in intercept estimates across WTA-Low δ-Indefinite and WTA-Low δ-Finite. For WTA-Low δ-Finite, the coefficient estimate for Round is −0.79 (p = 0.047) and the corresponding estimate is −1.18 (p = 0.001) for the WTA-Low δ-Indefinite session. There is also no difference in intercept estimates across PP-Low δ-Indefinite and PPLow δ-Finite. For the PP-Low δ-Finite session, the slope estimate is −1.24 (p = 0.012) and for PP-Low δ-Indefinite the slope estimate is −0.16, but the latter is not statistically different from zero (p = 0.586). Thus, over time average expenditure in the PP-Low δ-Indefinite treatment may exceed that in the PP-Low δ-Finite treatment.
The conclusions in the preceding paragraphs are supported by expenditure estimates for Rounds 1-20. There are no significant differences is estimated expenditure across WTA-Low δ-Indefinite and WTA-Low δ-Finite. In PP-Low δ-Indefinite, average expenditure is estimated to be statistically significantly larger than average expenditure in PP-Low δ-Finite for Rounds 16-20 (p < 0.10 or lower in these rounds).
We now examine differences across the WTA and PP settings directly and thereby assess Hypothesis 3. Interestingly, all four of the WTA and PP CDFs exhibit a jump at the expenditure level of x = 20. In all of the comparisons, and particularly in the Indefinite treatments, this expenditure level appears focal for WTA participants but not for PP participants. All of the CDFs, especially those for the Indefinite treatments, suggest higher average expenditure in the PP setting relative to the WTA setting.
Does contest setting affect expenditure?
We do not conduct statistical tests on these cumulative distributions because the data include repeat observations from each participant and thus are not independent within each CDF. Rather, we now report separate regression analysis for our Finite treatments and for our Indefinite treatments. Figure 4 shows comparisons across WTA and PP settings for finitely repeated contests. No differences in average expenditure are apparent in the 5 round High δ supergames. But Figures 4c and 4d suggest that average expenditure may be higher in the PP setting compared to the WTA setting in the 2 round Low δ supergames. However, the eyeball analysis of Figure 4 is not confirmed by the regressions in Table  6 . Our analysis in this section mirrors our earlier regression analysis. The variable PP is an indicator equal to 1 if the participant's expenditure was made in a proportional-prize setting, and 0 otherwise. The coefficient estimates on PP are not significantly different from zero in either of the two specifications that control for experience-models (2) and (4).
Finitely Repeated Contests
The estimates on Round (which apply to the WTA setting) are significant and negative for both values of δ. By adding the coefficient estimates on Round to those on the interaction term, we can calculate the slope estimates for the PP setting. For PP-High δ-Finite, the slope estimate is −0.61 (p = 0.000). The corresponding estimate for PP-Low δ-Finite is −1.24 (p = 0.014).
These estimates suggest that average expenditure in High δ stays close over time across the two contest settings. This is confirmed by Figure 4c . However, for Low δ, average expenditure drops less quickly over time in the PP setting relative to the WTA setting.
We also calculate estimated expenditures for the High δ-Finite and Low δ-Finite treatments. The differences between estimated expenditure in PP contests and WTA contests are presented in Table 4 for Rounds 1-20. Positive differences indicate greater expenditure in PP contests relative to WTA contests. There are no significant differences in the High δ data. In the Low δ data, while a number of early rounds contain significantly larger expenditure predictions for PP contests relative to WTA contests, there are no long-run differences.
Result 4. There is no evidence that long-run expenditure is different in proportional-prize and winner-take-all contests for finitely repeated contests.
We now report our final comparison on expenditure differences across contest settings in indefinitely repeated contests. Figure 5 shows average expenditure across all rounds (top panel) and average Round 1 expenditure across all 10 supergames (bottom panel), both by treatment. The time series for the High δ treatments are on the left of the figure, and the time series for the Low δ treatments are on the right. In both cases, there appears to be a difference in average expenditure across contest settings. Namely, average expenditure appears greater in the proportional-prize indefinite contests. Table 7 shows regression results for different contest settings in indefinitely repeated contests. The variable PP is as described above. Notice that in specifications (2) and (4), there are no significant intercept estimates. However, both slope estimates are significant and negatively signed. For the High δ data, the partial effect of time on expenditure in WTA contests (i.e. Round ) is −0.48 and significant. The comparable partial effect for PP contests is −0.32 (p = 0.014). Thus, average expenditure declines slightly less with each round of experience in the PP setting compared to the WTA setting. This is in line with Figure 5c . The partial effect of time on expenditure for WTA-Low δ is −1.18. For PP-Low δ, the estimate is −0.16 (p = 0.584). In other words, there is no time trend in average Round 1 expenditure in the PP setting (see Figure 5d) .
Indefinitely Repeated Contests
In Table 4 , column (8) shows that the difference between estimated PP expenditure and estimated WTA expenditure is positive and significant for Rounds 10-20 for the Low δ data.
Result 5. Long-run average expenditure in proportional-prize indefinitely repeated contests is higher than in winner-take-all indefinitely repeated contests for δ = 0.5.
In the next section, we examine this result and Result 2 in more detail.
Do risk preferences and gender affect expenditure?
Our two statistically significant treatment differences are: Experience interacts with the PP setting to produce lower average expenditure in δ = 0.8 indefinite contests relative to δ = 0.5 indefinite contests (Result 2), and experience interacts with the contest setting to produce higher average expenditure in PP-Low δ indefinite contests relative to WTALow δ indefinite contests (Result 5). In this section, we re-examine our data to see if these results hold up when controlling for risk preferences and gender, which have both previously been found to significantly affect participant investment behavior.
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Our first treatment comparison illustrates how we extend specification (5) to control 10 For WTA contests, more risk-averse participants have been found to make significantly lower investments (Millner and Pratt, 1991; Anderson and Freeborn, 2010; Sheremeta and Zhang, 2010; Sheremeta, 2011; Mago, Sheremeta and Yates, 2013; Shupp et al., 2013; Cason, Masters and Sheremeta, Forthcoming) , and women have been found to make significantly higher investments (Mago, Sheremeta and Yates, 2013; Brookins and Ryvkin, 2014; Price and Sheremeta, 2015) , although these findings are not universal. For PP contests, Cason, Masters and Sheremeta (Forthcoming) report lower investments by risk-averse participants, but there has yet to be a reported association between gender on contest investment in this setting.
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for risk and gender:
where our estimating sample only contains Round 1 data, and where HighDelta i is replaced with Indef inite i or P P i for our other treatment comparisons.
Risk i ∈ {1, 10} is a cardinal measure of risk aversion equal to the switch point in the Holt and Laury (2002) risk elicitation mechanism. This variable was elicited from our participants prior to data collection for this paper. A value of 5 is consistent with riskneutrality, while values below 5 are consistent with risk-attraction, and values above 5 are consistent with risk-aversion. We are missing Risk i for 55 of our 240 participants because we only use data for participants who "switched" one time (or zero times). Our other new regressor is F emale i , an indicator variable equal to 1 if the participant reported being female (and 0 otherwise). We are missing F emale i for one participant (from PP-High δ-Finite). Table 8 shows re-estimates of the expenditure differences in Table 4 that account for risk and gender. We illustrate how these new expenditure estimates are calculated using our first treatment comparison:
where Risk Highδ is the mean of Risk across all participants in High δ, and Risk Highδ,F emale is the mean of Risk over all female participants in High δ. We discuss the results in Table  8 in the following subsections.
PP-High δ-Indefinite and PP-Low δ-Indefinite comparison
Relative to Table 4 , there is no longer a statistically significant difference between PPHigh δ-Indefinite and PP-Low δ-Indefinite in Table 8 . How does controlling for risk and gender translate into a null result? Table 9 presents the mean risk and mean expenditure values by treatment and by gender. The raw risk averages in the table do not suggest a 25 Note: Significance levels: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
difference across genders, and there was no significant, ex ante difference in Risk across men and women in High δ (p = 0.264) or in Low δ (p = 0.911).
11 The table does indicate that female participants had higher average expenditure than their male counterparts in both PP-High δ-Indefinite and PP-Low δ-Indefinite.
12 Table 9 also gives partial effect estimates of Risk on Expnd and of F emale on Expnd. The former partial effect can be interpreted as the change in expenditure (in ECUs) of a participant switching at one lottery further down the list in the Holt and Laury (2002) risk elicitation mechanism (of being more risk averse). Risk aversion has a significant and negative effect on expenditure in three of the four treatment and gender combinations. However, the partial effect of Risk is not significantly different across females and males in High δ (p = 0.374) or in Low δ (p = 0.234).
The two partial effects of F emale in Table 9 indicate that female participants had 11 A rank sum test (n m = 13, n f = 17) and a robust rank test (n m = 12, n f = 18) were used, respectively. The robust rank test was used because the variance in Risk was not equal across PP-High δ-Indefinite and PP-Low δ-Indefinite.
12 To test this we regressed expenditure on gender and treatment dummies with standard errors clustered at the participant level and then tested the appropriate combination of coefficient estimates. Female participants had higher average expenditure in High δ (p = 0.029) and in Low δ (p = 0.011). Significance levels: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
significantly larger expenditures than their male counterparts in both PP-High δ-Indefinite and in PP-Low δ-Indefinite. 13 However, there is not a significant difference in the partial effect of F emale across the two treatments (p = 0.656). This conclusion is supported by Figure 6 which shows kernel densities for Round 1 expenditure in the PP indefinite contests, by gender. So why do we observe significantly lower expenditure in PP-High δ-Indefinite than in PP-Low δ-Indefinite when we do not control for risk and gender (as in Section 5.1)? The difference across genders in average expenditure was -0.77 ECUs. However, this figure does not account for the gender composition of the two treatments, and there was a higher percentage of females in High δ than in Low δ.
The difference in the partial effect of gender on expenditure across treatments was 4.07 ECUs. While this figure is not significantly different from zero, coupled with the difference in gender composition across High δ and Low δ, it suggests that High δ had a few more female participants who had a little higher expenditure. This being the case, when we control for gender (Table 8) we do not see a significant effect across treatments, whereas when we do not control for gender, we do see a significant effect (Table 4) .
Result 6. When we do not control for risk and gender, we find significantly less expenditure in PP-High δ-Indefinite relative to PP-Low δ-Indefinite. Females had higher average expenditure than males in both treatments, and the gender composition was slightly more skewed towards females in High δ than in Low δ. When we control for risk and gender we find no significant difference in expenditure across the treatments. We conclude that the specific gender composition of our participant sample explains Result 2.
13 These partial effects are calculated using the treatment average of Risk. Expenditure, by Treatment and Gender
PP-High δ-Indefinite and PP-High δ-Finite comparison
In column (4) of Table 8 , there is a significant difference in average expenditure across PP-High δ-Indefinite and PP-High δ-Finite in the long-run. In contrast, in Table 4 there is no significant difference across these two treatments. When we control for risk and gender, expenditure is significantly higher in the Indefinite treatment relative to the Finite treatment. This finding accords with Figure 2d , but it is very surprising in light of Hypothesis 2a, which predicts the opposite.
Result 7. Controlling for risk and gender, and after several rounds of contest experience, average expenditure is higher in indefinitely repeated PP contests with δ = 0.8 relative to finitely repeated PP contests with δ = 0.8.
WTA and PP comparisons
In Table 8 , short-run expenditure is higher in PP-Low δ-Finite relative to WTA-Low δ-Finite, but this difference disappears over time. However, there are long-run expenditure differences in the indefinite contests. Over time, estimated expenditure is significantly larger in the PP setting relative to the WTA setting in both the High δ and the Low δ indefinite contest data. Table 10 contains the same information as does Table 9 , but for the PP and WTA indefinite contest comparisons. Note: Partial effects on F emale evaluated at the treatment averages of Risk. Standard errors for means in parenthesis. Significance levels: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
In the High δ treatments, females were significantly more risk averse ex ante than males in the WTA setting (rank sum test, n m = 11, n f = 16, p = 0.059), but the ex post partial effect of Risk on expenditure was not significant (p = 0.286). There was no significant difference in risk ex ante in the PP setting (rank sum test, n m = 13, n f = 17, p = 0.264), and the partial effect of Risk across genders was not significant in PP-High δ-Indefinite (p = 0.375) Table 10 also contains information on gender and expenditure. Female and male participants had statistically indistinguishable expenditures in WTA-High δ-Indefinite (p = 0.488), but female participants had higher expenditures than their male counterparts to the tune of 13.85 ECUs in PP-High δ-Indefinite (p = 0.029). The magnitude of the partial effect of F emale on expenditure is similar (15.37 ECUs), and is also significantly different (p = 0.077) across contest settings for High δ.
WTA-Low δ-Indefinite and PP-Low δ-Indefinite can also be compared via Table 10 . There is neither a significant ex ante risk difference across gender in the WTA setting (p = 1.000), nor in the PP setting (p = 0.895).
14 Risk has a negative and significant partial effect on expenditure in three of the four gender and treatment cases, but the partial effect of Risk is not significantly different across men and women in WTA contests (p = 0.206) or in PP contests (p = 0.234).
On the other hand, there are significant differences in expenditure across females and males. Both the mean expenditure and the partial effect of F emale on expenditure are negative and significant in WTA-Low δ-Indefinite, while both are positive and significant in PP-Low δ-Indefinite. The two mean expenditures are different from one another (p = 0.004), as are the two partial effects of F emale on expenditure (p = 0.016).
Result 8. Female participants had higher average expenditure than male participants in PP indefinite contests with δ = 0.5 or δ = 0.8. Female participants had lower average expenditure than male participants in WTA indefinite contests when δ = 0.5. Controlling for risk and gender, average expenditure is higher in indefinitely repeated PP contests than in indefinitely repeated WTA contests in the long-run.
We now discuss our results and conclude.
Discussion and Conclusion
Despite the recent surge in experimental contest work (Dechenaux, Kovenock and Sheremeta, 2015) , no research has yet examined indefinitely repeated contests. Such contests are interesting in their own right because of their prevalence in economic life, but also because they shed empirical light on indefinitely repeated games with (relatively) large strategy spaces and complex payoff structures. This paper experimentally examines three primary questions related to indefinitely repeated contests.
First, is cooperation increasing in the expected length of indefinite contest supergames? There is no significant difference in average expenditure across WTA-High δ-Indefinite and WTA-Low δ-Indefinite, even when we control for risk and gender. We find some evidence of lower average expenditure (more cooperation) in PP-High δ-Indefinite compared to PPLow δ-Indefinite. But after controlling for risk and gender, we attribute this difference to a gender composition effect across these two treatments.
Second, is there more cooperation in indefinite contest supergames compared to finite contest supergames? Surprisingly, we find no support for more cooperation in indefinite contests compared to finite contests. If anything, when we control for risk and gender, there is evidence of greater average expenditure in the long-run in PP-Low δ-Indefinite relative to PP-Low δ-Finite.
Our third and final question is: Is cooperation the same across indefinite winner-takeall and indefinite proportional-prize contests? In our indefinite contests, there is strong evidence of less cooperation in the PP setting relative to the WTA setting when δ = 0.5, whether we control for risk and gender or not. When we control for risk and gender, there is also evidence of less cooperation in PP-High δ indefinite contests than in WTA-High δ indefinite contests.
Our WTA-PP results contrast with the results in Cason, Masters and Sheremeta (Forthcoming). They report higher average expenditure in WTA contests compared to PP contests. We find the opposite to be true in both finitely repeated and indefinitely repeated contests. However, there are a number of important differences between our experiments and theirs. In particular, their contest success function has a random noise component and they use quadratic expenditure costs.
We find that the WTA-PP expenditure difference in our indefinite contests is driven by female participants with relatively high expenditures. This is a novel result in the indefinitely repeated games literature and in the finitely repeated contests literature. Dal Bó and Fréchette (Forthcoming) , focusing on the PD, report that the literature has "not found a robust relationship between gender and cooperation in infinitely repeated games." In the contest literature, Sheremeta (2013) and Dechenaux, Kovenock and Sheremeta (2015) report that women overbid more relative to equilibrium than men in finitely repeated WTA contests. Our interesting results on gender in indefinite contests deserve further examination, but we leave such a study for future research and a targeted experimental design that is better suited than ours for such an exploration.
Perhaps our most surprising result is that indefiniteness does not affect expenditure in our repeated contests. This conclusion is surprising because indefiniteness does matter in repeated prisoner's dilemmas. Here we can only speculate as to why this is so. It is possible that in indefinite prisoner's dilemmas, players can focus on the length uncertainty because payoffs are certain. By contrast, perhaps players in indefinite contests cannot focus on the length uncertainty because they must contend with payoff uncertainty. We observe similar time trends in average expenditure in all of our treatments: Average expenditure falls over the first several supergames. This is consistent with participants grappling with payoff uncertainty, and the idea that participants need experience to realize that mutual expenditure reductions (cooperation) can be beneficial in contests.
To the best of our knowledge, our paper is only the third experimental examination of indefinitely repeated games with "large" strategy spaces. Tan and Wei (2014) and Lugovskyy et al. (2017) both investigate indefinitely repeated public good games. Like us, they report less support for predictions from the theory of repeated games than have experimental examinations of indefinite prisoner's dilemmas. More empirical work on indefinite supergames with large strategy spaces is clearly needed, but the early returns from papers examining indefinite supergames with many feasible strategies suggest that participant behavior in such supergames does not conform well to the theory of repeated games.
Introduction
Thank you for participating in today's experiment. Your earnings will depend on your own decisions and the decisions of other participants. Your earnings, including your $7.00 show-up fee, will be paid to you privately in cash at the end of the experiment.
Please remain quiet and do not communicate with other participants. If you have a question, raise your hand and wait for a proctor to come answer your question privately.
In the experiment, your payoffs will be denominated in experimental currency units (ECUs for short). At the end of the experiment, ECUs will be converted into cash at an exchange rate of 25 ECUs to $1.
Timeline
Today's experiment will last 10 Periods.
Each Period consists of an uncertain number of Decisions. The actual number of Decisions in a given Period will be randomly determined. So any two Periods may or may not contain the same number of Decisions.
In each Decision you will make an allocation. After you've made your allocation, the computer will randomly determine if there will be another Decision in the current Period. There will be a 80% chance of another Decision (and a 20% chance that the Period ends).
After each Decision, the computer will randomly select one of the following integers: {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}. The computer is equally likely to select any of these integers. If the computer selects "1," there will be no further allocation decisions, and the current Period will conclude. If the computer selects "2," "3," "4," or "5," the Period will continue for another Decision. Note that the odds that the computer randomly selects "1" are 1/5 or 20%.
Pairing Procedure
Within a Period, regardless of the number of Decisions it contains, you'll be paired with the same participant during each Decision.
Between Periods, you'll be randomly paired with another participant with whom you have never been previously paired.
Decisions
In each Decision, you will have 120 ECUs at your disposal.
You will decide how many of these 120 ECUs you wish to allocate towards possibly receiving 120 additional ECUs.
You can allocate any integer amount between 0 ECUs and 120 ECUs.
What determines if you receive the 120 additional ECUs? You will allocate a certain number of ECUs as will the participant you are paired with. Suppose that you allocate X ECUs and that the participant you are paired with allocates Y ECUs. In this example, you have a X/(X+Y) chance of receiving the 120 additional ECUs.
In other words, your chance of receiving the 120 additional ECUs is equal to the number of ECUs you allocate divided by the total number of ECUs allocated by both you and the participant you are paired with.
In each Decision, either you or the participant you are paired with will receive all the 120 additional ECUs.
Note that if both X and Y are 0 (zero), your chance of receiving the 120 additional ECUs is 1/2 or 50%.
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Payoffs
Your payoff in each Decision will be calculated as follows:
• If you do receive the 120 additional ECUs, you will earn P AY OF F = (120 − ALLOCAT ED ECU s) + 120
• If you don't receive the 120 additional ECUs, you will earn P AY OF F = (120 − ALLOCAT ED ECU s) + 0 Your payoff in a given Period will be the sum of your payoffs for all the Decisions that make up that Period (recall that the number of Decisions in a Period is uncertain).
Note that any of the 120 ECUs at your disposal that are not allocated towards possibly receiving the additional ECUs are included in your payoff.
The participant you are paired with has exactly the same payoff equation that you do, but you may have different payoffs in a given Decision, depending upon who receives the additional ECUs.
All participants in today's session will be paid for 1 randomly selected Period. The computer will randomly select the Period that you will be paid for after the experiment concludes.
Practice
Before the actual experiment begins, you will make some Practice Decisions. By practicing, you will become familiar with how your chance of receiving the additional ECUs is determined.
You will not interact with other participants during this practice, and your practice decisions won't be shown to anyone. You won't earn anything for Practice Decisions; they are simply to help you understand the experiment.
Just like in Decisions in the actual experiment, you will practice allocating ECUs towards possibly receiving 120 additional ECUs. During these Practice Decisions you will also choose a hypothetical allocation for the participant you are paired with. In the actual experiment, you will be paired with a real participant who will make their own allocation decision.
In just a moment, you will be able to practice making three allocation decisions.
Summary
• This experiment will last 10 Periods
• Periods consist of Decisions -each Period will have at least 1 Decision -the total number of Decisions in a Period is uncertain -after each Decision, there is a 80% chance that another decision will occur in the current Period (there is a 20% chance that the current Period ends)
• You will be paired with the same participant during each Period, but randomly paired with another participant with whom you have never been previously paired between each Period
• Each Decision, you will have 120 ECUs at your disposal
• Each Decision, you can receive 120 additional ECUs depending on your own allocation and the allocation of the participant you are paired with
• Each Decision, either you or the participant you are paired with will receive all the 120 additional ECUs
• Each Decision, your payoff will be:
120 − ALLOCATED ECUs + ADDITIONAL ECUs (if you receive them)
• Your Period payoff is the sum of your payoffs for all the Decisions in that Period
